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COMMENTS
TREATY CONGESTION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW: THE NEED FOR GREATER
INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of multilateral environmental agreements in the
international community has proliferated greatly since the 1972
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in
Stockholm, Sweden.' When the conference was held in 1972,
there were approximately three dozen multilateral environmen-
tal agreements in existence.2 In 1989, the United Nations' En-
vironmental Programme (UNEP) Register of Environmental
Agreements listed a total of 139 treaties.? Today, there are
more than 900 international legal instruments, including trea-
ties and binding or non-binding agreements that "are either
focused on [the] environment or contain one or more important
provisions concerned with the environment."4 This growth and
1. See EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONiENTAL LAW: BASIC
INSTRUMENTS AND REFERENCES ix (1992) [hereinafter BROWN WEISS, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONIENTAL LAW]; Edith Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance with
International Environmental Agreements, 27 ENVTL. POLy & L. 297, 297 (1997) [here-
inafter Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance].
2. See Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance, supra note 1, at 297.
3. See PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 105
(1995). The growth in the number of treaties registered on the UNEP register has al-
most doubled in each decade since the 1950s. There were 6 treaties registered by
1950, 18 registered during the 1950s, 26 registered in the 1960s, 47 registered in the
1970s, and 41 registered in the 1980s. See id.
4. Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance, supra note 1, at 297.
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success in negotiating multilateral environmental agreements is
likely to continue in the future.
Not surprisingly, the rapid, almost exponential, development
of international environmental law in the last two and a half
decades has created some problems. One of these problems is
addressed in the concept of "treaty congestion."5 The definition
of treaty congestion used in this article encompasses not only
the concept of actual substantive treaty conflict envisioned un-
der the Vienna Convention of Treaties, but also broader notions
of treaty obligation and objective conflicts as well as procedural
conflicts of time, compliance energy, and compliance require-
ments. Treaty congestion is a significant problem in interna-
tional law because it contributes to inefficiency and non-compli-
ance among existing multilateral environmental agreements.
The concept of treaty congestion may be divided into two
main categories: substantive treaty congestion and procedural
treaty congestion. Substantive treaty congestion includes those
situations where provisions in existing treaties actually con-
flict,6 obligations among treaties are inconsistent, gaps exist in
coverage, and goals and responsibilities are duplicated.7 Proce-
dural treaty congestion refers to those problems that occur,
especially in developing countries, due to a lack of time and
trained human resources to effectively handle all of the duties
arising under each international agreement that the state has
ratified.' For example, assume that State Y is a signatory to
5. See, e.g., Gunter Handl, Compliance Control Mechanisms and International
Environmental Obligations, 5 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 29, 29-30 (1997) (describing
"treaty congestion" as a buzz word in international environmental legal discussions).
Currently, no precise definition of "treaty congestion" has been put forth in any schol-
arly journal. Nevertheless, Edith Brown Weiss discusses several "side effects" of this
phenomenon in her article, Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law:
Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 675,
697-702 (1995). These side effects include the following: (1) operational inefficiency
such as lack of coordination in the system of international agreements; (2) inconsis-
tencies in treaty obligations; (3) gaps in coverage between treaties; (4) duplication of
treaty goals and responsibilities; (5) inefficiencies in implementation; and (6) overload
at the national level in implementing international agreements. See id.
6. See infra Part H and accompanying notes.
7. See Brown Weiss, supra note 5, at 699-700.
8. See SANDS, supra note 3, at 141 (noting that "it is evident that states are
taking on international environmental commitments which are increasingly stringent
and which must be complied with").
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one hundred international environmental treaties, and that
State Y must file yearly reports under fifty of the treaties, send
delegates at least every three years to the protocols and conven-
tions under all of the respective treaties, and implement and
enforce all of the treaties. All of these duties create an over-
whelming task. This is a common example of procedural treaty
congestion.
Although procedural treaty congestion and substantive treaty
congestion are intertwined in many ways, this article focuses
primarily on the issue of substantive treaty congestion. Current
efforts of addressing treaty congestion are not sufficient to solve
the problem. Part II of this article describes the concept of trea-
ty congestion in greater detail introducing a recent example of
treaty congestion between the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES)9 and the International Tropical Timber Agreement
(ITTA) ° involving the listing of mahogany as an Appendix III
under CITES.
Part III discusses and analyzes current and previously sug-
gested solutions to the problem of treaty congestion. This sec-
tion specifically addresses efforts to resolve treaty congestion
under the Vienna Convention on Treaties by the creation of a
supranational body, common housing of secretariats, and fre-
quent meetings of secretariats. None of these currently pro-
posed or presently used solutions properly and effectively ad-
dress the concept of treaty congestion. Thus, Part IV includes
two additional proposals for solutions to the problem of treaty
congestion. The first, increased use of the Internet, may be
used in conjunction with any of the methods already in use or
currently proposed to increase effectiveness. The second solu-
tion, the creation of a NEPA-like" approach to treaty drafting
and revision, would be a more effective method of solving the
9. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES].
10. International Tropical Timber Agreement, date of adoption Nov. 18, 1983,
U.N. Doc. TD/TIMBER/I1/Rev.1 (1984), available at International Tropical Timber
Agreement (visited Dec. 21, 1998) <http://sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/tropical.timber.
1983.html> [hereinafter 1983 ITTA]; International Tropical Timber Agreement, Jan.
26, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1014 [hereinafter 1994 ITTA].
11. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1994).
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treaty congestion problems which have occurred and continue to
occur as a result of the massive proliferation of international
environmental agreements in today's global society.
II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CITES AND ITTA
A. The Issue of Treaty Congestion
Although the concept of treaty congestion has been discussed
in both the academic and professional realms of international
law, no scholar or practitioner has yet put forth a precise defi-
nition of the term. "Treaty congestion" is a term of art used to
describe the problems of actual substantive treaty conflict, trea-
ty obligation and objective conflicts, and procedural conflicts
which arise as a result of the proliferation of international
treaties in the past three decades. The concept of treaty conges-
tion may be further broken down into two categories: substan-
tive treaty congestion and procedural treaty congestion.
Substantive treaty congestion, as noted above, includes those
situations where provisions in existing treaties actually conflict,
obligations among treaties are inconsistent, or goals and respon-
sibilities of treaties conflict. This problem of treaty conflict, at-
tributed to the increasingly expanding number of international
treaties, was recognized as early as the 1980s when the United
Nations reviewed the process of multilateral treaty making. 2
"As the body of international law created by multilateral trea-
ties increases, greater and greater problems arise about possible
conflict between treaties already in force, whether in a world-
wide or regional or otherwise restricted basis, and new pro-
posed instruments."13 The conflicts under substantive treaty
congestion may arise in the form of a precise conflict in lan-
guage. Other conflicts may be those of obligations, such as are
discussed in the example involving the CITES and the ITTA in
Part II.B.3. below.
An example of substantive treaty congestion that has been
widely debated in scholarly circle centers around the consisten-
12. See UNITED NATIONS, REVIEW OF THE MULTILATERAL TREATY-MAKING PROCESS
32, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/21, U.N. Sales No. E/F.83.V.8 (1985).
13. Id.
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cy problems that arise between using trade sanctions to enforce
environmental multilateral agreements and the most favored
nation principle of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).'4 General issues of treaty congestion, in the form of
obligation conflict, exist in that both the GATT and an interna-
tional environmental treaty may address the issue of trade
measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health."5 Specific issues of treaty conflict, also embodied in
the concept of treaty congestion, may only arise when involved
parties are both members to a multilateral environmental
agreement under which trade sanctions are created, and in-
volved parties are both members of the GATT. 6
Procedural treaty congestion, on the other hand, focuses on
the problems that arise, especially in developing countries, due
to a lack of time and resources to handle effectively all of the
procedural duties that arise under each international agreement
to which the state is a party. Reporting congestion is a promi-
nent example of procedural treaty congestion. Most internation-
al environmental agreements expressly require parties to report
on either an annual or biannual basis." The sheer number of
reports required often limits the ability of countries, especially
developing countries, to meet reporting requirements. For exam-
14. See generally Robert A. Brand, Sustaining the Development of International
Trade and Environmental Law, 21 VT. L. REv. 823 (1997); see also Brown Weiss,
Strengthening National Compliance, supra note 1, at 298-99; Christine Crawford, Con-
flicts Between the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species and the
GATT in Light of Actions to Halt the Rhinoceros and Tiger Trade, 7 GEO. INTVL
ENvTL. L. REv. 555 (1995) (discussing a conflict between the GATT and the CITES).
Article I of the GATT, which sets out the "most favored nation" principle, pro-
vides that a contracting party to the GATT may not discriminate against trade with
one contracting party in favor of another contracting party. All contracting parties
must be treated alike in the application of tariffs and commercial policies. See Brand,
supra, at 828.
15. Brand, supra note 14, at 836. This general obligational/objective conflict arises
despite the fact that the signatories to the conflicting international treaty might be
asimilar.
16. See id. at 862-64. Brand states that the most significant examples of substan-
tive treaty conflict occur when both countries are members of both the multilateral
environmental treaty and the GATT. In those instances, Brand states, the laws of
treaty construction must be used to resolve the relationship between the two treaties'
rules. See id.
17. See SANDS, supra note 3, at 147.
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ple, under CITES, only twenty-five of the 104 parties submitted
reports summarizing their 1989 import/export certificates."
The problems of procedural and substantive treaty congestion
will increase as the number of multilateral international envi-
ronmental treaties continues to expand. The next section ex-
plores a recent treaty congestion problem which arose between
the CITES and the ITTA over the use and trade of mahogany.
In short, an obligational conflict arises between the two trea-
ties. On one hand, any listing of mahogany with the CITES as
an endangered species would dictate potentially severe restric-
tions on the trade of mahogany in countries which produce this
species of flora. On the other hand, ITTA advocates the sustain-
able use and trade of this species and frowns upon any ban on
mahogany trade.
B. The CITES v. the ITTA
1. The Structure of the CITES
The CITES was designed in 1973 to address the problem of.
illegal trade in endangered species. Today, more than 144 coun-
tries are parties to the CITES. 9 The CITES' stated purpose is
to "ensure through international co-operation, that the interna-
tional trade in specimens of species of wild fauna and flora
does not threaten the conservation status of the species con-
cerned.""
The degree of protection offered under the CITES is divided
into three categories depending in which of the three appendi-
ces the species is listed.2' Appendix I includes "all species
threatened with extinction which are or may be affected by
trade."22 In general, Appendix I species are offered the most
18. See id. at 148.
19. See EDITH BROWN WEISS, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 981
(1998); THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A SUR-
VEY OF EXISTING LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 116-20 (Peter H. Sand ed., 1992) [hereinafter
UNCED SURVEY] (listing 112 parties to the Convention as of January 1992).
20. UNCED SURVEY, supra note 19, at 79.
21. See CITES, supra note 9, art. II, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245-46,
12 I.L.M. at 1088.
22. Id. art. II, 1 1, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245, 12 I.L.M. at 1088.
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protection, and trade in these species is either banned or very
heavily regulated.' Appendix II includes "all species which
although not necessarily now threatened with extinction may
become so unless trade in specimens of such species is subject
to strict regulation in order to avoid utilization incompatible
with their survival."' Trade in these species is less regulated
than Appendix I species; however, imports and exports of Ap-
pendix II species are still regulated by a permit system." A
species is listed to either Appendix I and Appendix II upon a
two-thirds majority vote of the parties present and voting.26
The CITES covers more than 600 species on the Appendix I
endangered list and more than 2300 species of animals and
24,000 plants on the Appendix II list of threatened species.
In addition to the protections offered under Appendices I and
II, an individual state may list a species to Appendix III if the
party identifies that species "as being subject to regulation
within its jurisdiction for the purpose of preventing or restrict-
ing exploitation, and as needing the co-operation of other Par-
ties in the control of trade."8 Appendix III listings are species
that usually are endangered within the listing state but not
necessarily considered endangered in the international commu-
nity. Trade in Appendix III species is allowed upon a show-
ing of an export permit from the listing state indicating that
the species was "not obtained in contravention of the laws of
23. See id. art. I1, 27 U.S.T. at 1093, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246-47, 12 I.L.M. at 1089.
Both the export and import of an Appendix I species require the presentation of both
an export and import permit. Permits are only issued when the scientific authority of
the country determines that the import/export will not be detrimental to the species,
that the species was obtained legally, that any living specimen will be transported
properly, that the recipient will suitably house and care for the specimen and, in the
case of an export permit, that an import permit has been granted. See id.
24. Id. art. II, 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245, 12 I.L.M. at 1088-89.
25. See id. art. IV, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 247, 12 I.L.M. at 1088-89.
A person transporting an Appendix H species need only obtain an export permit,
which must be presented both upon export and import. See id.
26. See id. art. XV, I 1(b), 2(j), 27 U.S.T. at 1093, 993 U.N.T.S. at 254, 12 I.L.M.
at 1093.
27. See BROWN WEISS, supra note 19, at 1944.
28. CITES, supra note 9, art. H, 3, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246, 12
I.L.M. at 1089.
29. See Crawford, supra note 14, at 558.
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that State for the protection of fauna and flora" ° and that the
specimen will be transported properly."'
2. The Structure of the ITTA
a. The 1983 International Tropical Timber Agreement3 2
The objectives of the 1983 ITTA are to "promote the manage-
ment of tropical forests on a sustainable basis and to provide a
framework for co-operation between producing and consuming
member states in the tropical timber industry."3 3 Tropical tim-
ber is defined within the treaty as "non-coniferous tropical wood
for industrial uses, which grows or is produced in the countries
situated between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capri-
corn." 4 Under this agreement, members aim to balance the
"sustainable utilization"35 of tropical timber with the "expan-
sion and diversification of international trade in tropical tim-
ber.""5 Members of this agreement, which also compose the
International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) created by
30. CITES, supra note 9, art. V, % 2(a), 27 U.S.T. at 1097, 993 U.N.T.S. at 248,
12 I.L.M. at 1090 (emphasis added).
31. See id. art. V, I 2(b), 27 U.S.T. at 1097, 993 U.N.T.S. at 248, 12 I.L.M. at
1090.
32. See 1983 ITTA, supra note 10.
33. UNCED SURVEY, supra note 19, at 105 (emphasis added). Multiple definitions
of the term "sustainable development" currently exist in the international community.
See generally United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, art. 2, 31 I.L.M. 818, 824 (defining sustain-
able use as "the use of components of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that
does not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its
potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future generations"); Ben
Boer, Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable Development: The Roles of National,
State and Local Governments in Translating Grand Strategy into Action, 31
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 307, 317-19 (1995). The concept of sustainable development in-
volves the "concepts of intragenerational and intergenerational equity, application of
the precautionary principle, the conservation of biological diversity and integrity, and
the internalisation of environmental costs." See id. at 318-19. OUR COMMON FUTURE,
a publication of the World Commission on Environment and Development, defines
sustainable development as "development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." Id. at 317
(quoting WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON
FUTURE 87 (Australian ed. 1990)).
34. 1983 ITTA, supra note 10, art. 2(1), at 9.
35. Id. art. 12(h), at 8.
36. Id. art. 1(b), at 8.
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the 1983 ITTA, are divided into two categories: producing
members and consuming members.37 These members have
three major duties: "to pay contributions to the Administrative
Account, and (in the case of developed consumer member na-
tions particularly) to the special account for projects; to provide
data on tropical timber requested by the Council; and to use
their best endeavors to co-operate to promote the attainment of
the [1983] ITTA objectives."38
b. The 1994 International Tropical Timber Agreement39
The objectives of the 1983 ITTA are further strengthened and
refined in the 1994 ITTA. Stated objectives of the 1994 ITTA
include the following: "to contribute to the process of sustain-
able development;"4 0 "to enhance the capacity of members to
implement a strategy for achieving exports of tropical timber
and timber products from sustainably managed sources by the
year 2000;"41 "to promote increased and further processing of
tropical timber from sustainable sources in producing member
countries with a view to promoting their industrialization and
thereby increasing their employment opportunities and export
earnings;"4 and "to improve marketing and distribution of
tropical timber exports from sustainably managed sources."43
Again, the objectives of the 1994 ITTA reflect the desire to
balance trade in tropical timber with sustainable forest man-
agement of tropical timber.
Under the 1994 ITTA, the ITTO, which consists of both pro-
ducing" and consuming members,45  remains in existence,
37. See id. art. 4, at 9. Annex A to the 1983 ITITA lists the producing members,
including Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, and Mexico. See id. Annex A. Annex B lists the
consuming members. See id. Annex B. Producing members are, for the most part,
developing countries and include almost all of the tropical timber producing countries
in the world. See UNCED SURVEY, supra note 19, at 107.
38. UNCED Survey, supra note 19, at 107.
39. 1994 ITTA, supra note 10.
40. Id. art. 1(c), 33 I.L.M. at 1017.
41. Id. art. 1(d), 33 I.L.M. at 1017.
42. Id. art. 1(i), 33 I.L.M. at 1018.
43. Id. art. 1(k), 33 I.L.M. at 1018.
44. See id. Annex A, 33 I.L.M. at 1042 (including Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, and
Mexico).
45. See id. Annex B, 33 I.L.M. at 1042.
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with the International Tropical Timber Council (Council) being
the highest authority of the ITTO.4" The 1994 ITTA also estab-
lishes the Bali Partnership Fund which serves to "assist pro-
ducing members to make the investments necessary to achieve
the objective of Article 1(d) of this Agreement."4 ' To achieve
the Article 1 objectives, the ITTO is required to "undertake pol-
icy work and project activities in the areas of Economic Infor-
mation and Market Intelligence, Reforestation and Forest Man-
agement and Forest Industry."' Finally, the Council must pro-
duce an annual report on the international timber situation and
"[o]ther factors, issues and developments considered relevant to
achieve the objectives of this Agreement."49 Any complaints
that members are not fulfilling their obligations under the 1994
ITTA Agreement are reported to the Council for decision." The
Council's decisions are binding on the members.5
3. The Conflict Between the CITES and the ITTA
a. The Debate over Mahogany
One of the continued debates in the field of environmental
conservation is the preservation of rainforests.52 The harvest-
ing of Latin American Mahogany is one of the major contrib-
uting sources to the destruction of rainforests.53 An estimated
1450 square meters of forest is destroyed for every one mahoga-
ny tree extracted.54 Furthermore, bigleaf mahogany (Swietenia
46. See id. arts. 3, 6, 33 I.L.M. at 1019-20.
47. Id. art. 21(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1028. The objective is to have sustainable managed
forests by the year 2000. See id.
48. Id. art. 24, 33 I.L.M. at 1030. The ITTO created the following committees to
aid in reaching its objectives: the Committee on Economic Information and Market
Intelligence; the Committee on Reforestation and Forest Management; the Committee
on Forest Industry; and the Committee on Finance and Administration. See id. arts.
26, 27, 33 I.L.M. 1031-34.
49. Id. art. 30(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1035.
50. Id. art. 31, 33 I.L.M. at 1035-36.
51. See id.
52. See generally Rainforest Alliance (visited Dec. 1, 1998) <http://www.rainforest-
alliance.org/>; Rainforest Action Network (visited Dec. 1, 1998) <http://www.ran.org>.
53. See Rainforest Action Network, Brazil Bans Mahogany Logging in the Amazon
(visited Dec. 1, 1998) <http'//www.ran.org/ran/info_center/press_release/mahog.html>.
The majority of mahogany that is sold today is illegally logged from the rainforests of
Brazil and Bolivia.
54. See The Case Against Mahogany (visited Apr. 2, 1999) <http://www.chsu.
1652
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macrophylla) found in thirteen Latin American countries, in-
cluding Brazil, Mexico, and Bolivia, is in danger of extinc-
tion.55 Despite this fact, bigleaf mahogany continues to be
logged at an unsustainable rate-an annual total volume of
500,000 cubic meters (about 137,773 trees).56 This is partially
because importers, particularly the United States, pay high
prices in international markets for mahogany. 7 As a result,
there has been an increase in campaigns to have trade in
bigleaf mahogany banned or severely restricted.58
The debate over limiting trade in bigleaf mahogany again
came to a head at the Tenth Conference of the Parties of
CITES, held in Harare, Zimbabwe from June 9, 1997 through
June 20, 1997."9 At this conference, the United States and Bo-
livia proposed to list bigleaf mahogany on Appendix II.60 The
proposal, however, was turned down, receiving only sixty-seven
out of 121 votes, which is seven votes short of approval.6 As
an Appendix II listed species, persons wishing to export mahog-
cam.ac.uk/green/ef/ease.html>.
55. See Sarah Tyack, Mahogany Misses CITES Appendix II Again (visited Dec. 1,
1998) <http'//www.enviroweb.org/rainrelieffnewsnotes/tyackl.htm>.
56. See Mahogany is Murder Fact Sheet (visited Apr. 1, 1998) <http://www.ran.
org/>.
57. See Rainforest Action Network, supra note 53 (stating that the United States
is the world's single largest importer of mahogany).
58. In early 1997, more than 137 leading United States environmental groups re-
quested that the United States seek an active role in acquiring CITES protection for
mahogany. Environmental groups that participated in this effort include the following:
Audubon Society; Defenders of Wildlife; Environmental Defense Fund; Environmental
Investigation Agency; Friends of the Earth USA; Greenpeace; Natural Resources De-
fense Council; Rainforest Action Network; Rainforest Relief; Sierra Club Legal Defense
Fund; and Western Ancient Forests Campaign. See Rainforest Action Network, U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Proposes Sweeping Protection for Threatened Amazon Mahogany
(visited Dec. 1, 1998) <http'//www.ran.org/ran/info.center/press-release/e-mahog.html>.
See discussion infra Part II.B.3.b.
59. See The Results of Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora [CITES] Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries Conservation,
Wildlife and Oceans of the House Comm. on Resources, 105th Cong. (1997) (unpub-
lished) (available in 1997 WL 400298, at *1) (statement of Donald Barry, Acting As-
sistant Secretary of Fish and Wildlife and Parks, Department of the Interior). See
also Tyack, supra note 55.
60. See Brazil Cuppers Tougher Mahogany "Listing," TIMBER TRADE J., June 28,
1997, at 4; Tyack, supra note 55; see also Rainforest Action Network, supra note 53
(stating that Bolivia is the leading mahogany exporting country).
61. See Brazil Cuppers Tougher Mahogany "Listing," supra note 60, at 4; Tyack,
supra note 55 (noting that this is the third time that a proposal to list bigleaf ma-
hogany on Appendix 11 of CITES has failed).
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any would be required to show that their mahogany export
permits were legally obtained.62
In a compromise, Brazil, Bolivia, and Mexico, some of the
largest exporters of mahogany, pledged to join Costa Rica in
listing bigleaf mahogany on Appendix III.' As an Appendix III
listed species, bigleaf mahogany would be considered "endan-
gered" within these countries. Also, the export of the mahogany
would be monitored intensely through the permit system and
potentially restricted according to the laws of the individual
country.' In addition to the Appendix III listing, Brazil agreed
to convene a working group of states to draft conservation rec-
ommendations within eighteen months.65
b. The Conflict
The potential listing of bigleaf mahogany as an Appendix III
species by Brazil, Bolivia, or Mexico, and the fact that it is
already listed as such by Costa Rica raises questions of poten-
tial conflict between the CITES and the ITTA. Currently, Brazil
and Bolivia are members to both the ITTA and the CITES.
66
How does this conflict exist? Under the ITTA, Brazil and
Bolivia have pledged to manage their forests sustainably by the
year 2000.67 Although this means that some conservation ef-
62. See CITES, supra note 9, art. IV, 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1095, 993 U.N.T.S. at 264
12 I.L.M. at 1089. An export permit is granted for an Appendix H species upon a
showing that "a scientific Authority of the State of the export has advised that such
export will not be detrimental to the survival of that species" and 'a Management
Authority of the State of export is satisfied that the specimen was not obtained in
contravention of the laws of that State for the protection of fauna and flora." Id.
63. See Oversight Hearings on CITES Meetings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries
Conservation, Wildlife, and Oceans of the House Comm. on Resources, 105th Cong. 29
(1997) (testimony of Donald Barry, Deputy Assistant Sec. for Fish and Wildlife and
Parks, Dept. of the Interior).
64. Currently 5.4 million acres of rainforest are destroyed in Brazil each year. See
Rainforest Action Network, Rates of Rainforest Loss (visited Dec. 1, 1998)
<http:www.ran.org/ran/info-center/rates.html>.
65. See Worldview CITES: Meeting Ends with Compromise on Mahogany, AM.
POLL NETWORK, June 23, 1997, at 19; see also Tyack, supra note 55 (stating that the
working group will include representatives from major importers such as the United
States and United Kingdom as well as countries in which the species is found).
66. See UNCED SURVEY, supra note 19, at 116-18.
67. See 1994 ITTA, supra note 10, Preamble, 33 I.L.M. at 1016-17.
[A] statement of commitment to maintain or achieve by the year 2000,
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forts will be undertaken to maintain each country's source of
mahogany, there will still be trade because the objectives of the
ITTA include efforts to promote trade and increase processing
of tropical timber." The CITES, on the other hand, has quite
an opposite objective-to restrict trade in endangered or
threatened species.69 Because an Appendix III listing requires
an export permit, which can only be granted when the speci-
men was not obtained in contravention of state laws, the con-
trast between the ITTA and the CITES becomes even more
defined depending on the individual country's domestic laws.70
For example, the Brazilian National Congress has placed a
moratorium on new mahogany logging through at least 1998. 7"
Now, backed up by a CITES Appendix III listing, the provision
receives added backbone-no export permits should be issued
on any new mahogany that is logged in Brazil. When listed
under Appendix III, a violation would not only be a violation of
state law under which the individual would be responsible, but
also a violation of the CITES treaty for which Brazil would be
responsible. This complete ban is in direct conflict with Brazil's
other obligation to ensure that trade in mahogany is only
sustainably managed under the ITTA. This conflict of obliga-
tions between the two treaties currently is recognized by both
the sustainable management of their respective forests [was] made by
consuming members who are parties to the International Tropical Timber
Agreement, 1983 at the fourth session of the United Nations Conference
for the Negotiation of a Successor Agreement to the International Tropi-
cal Timber Agreement, 1983 in Geneva on 21 January 1994.
Id. at 1016.
68. See id. art. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1017.
69. See Letter from Department of State to Richard M. Nixon, President of the
United States of America (Apr. 5, 1973), reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1085.
70. See CITES, supra note 9, art. V, T 2(a), 27 U.S.T. at 1097, 933 U.N.T.S. at
248, 12 I.L.M. at 1090.
71. See Rainforest Action Network, Brazil Bans Mahogany Logging in the Ama-
zon: Will U.S.A Ban Mahogany Imports (visited Dec. 29, 1998) <http-//www.ran.org/
ranlinfocenter/press..release/mahog.html> (press release dated July 29, 1996); see also
Rainforest Action Network, Brazilian State of Amazonas Suspends New Logging Pro-
jects (visited Dec. 29, 1998) <http'//www.ran.org/ran/info-center/press-releaseam log-
ging.html> (press release dated Feb. 3, 1998, stating that the government of the
Brazilian state of Amazonas has put a hold on million dollar investment projects put
forward by Chinese and Malaysian companies).
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the Council of the ITTA and the CITES.72 Efforts have begun
to resolve this treaty congestion.
c. The CITES Timber Working Group
The CITES has established a Timber Working Group (TWG)
in response to the ongoing conflict between the CITES and the
ITTA.7 3 The working group originally was approved at the
Ninth Conference of the Parties, held in November 1994.74 The
original decision states:
Regarding implementation of the Convention for timber
species
4. A temporary working group shall be established,
chaired by the Chairman of the Plants Committee, who
would:
a) in consultation with the Standing Committee: a) estab-
lish limited terms of reference for the working group, which
address the technical and practical problems associated with
the implementation of tree listings; b) define the relation-
ship of the group with existing international organizations,
which are at present addressing the problem of sustainable
use of timber resources; and c) consider other associated
matters referred to the group by the Plants Committee, the
Standing Committee, or the Secretariat;
b) ensure that relevant expertise is the key issue when
deciding upon participation in the working group;
c) ensure range States are present to contribute their ex-
pertise;
d) ensure that temperate, boreal and tropical forest prod-
uct issues are likewise addressed; and
72. See Recent Forest Policy Meetings: Other Forest Meetings-International Tropi-
cal Timber Organization (ITTO) (visited Dec. 29, 1998) <http'//www.iisd.ca/linkages/
forestry/recent.html#otherforests> (discussing the events of the 20th Session of the
International Tropical Timber Council held in Manila, Philippines, from May 15-23,
1996). At this meeting, producer member countries expressed concern about the inclu-
sion of mahogany in Appendix III of the CITES and the debate on the relationship
between the ITTO and the CITES. See id.; see also ITTO Council Reaches Temporary
Pact on Certification, Endangered Species, 17 Int'l Env't. Rep. (BNA) (June 1, 1994)
460 (stating that the ITTO's "members should coordinate actions between the ITTO
and the CITES to avoid incompatible points of view") (internal quotes omitted).
73. See CITES Decisions 9th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties (visited Dec.
29, 1998) <http://www.wcmc.org.uk/CITES/english/edecis9.htm#17>.
74. See id.
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e) report back to the tenth meeting of the Conference of
the Parties.75
The ITTO has requested "effective participation of ITTO in all
meetings of the TWG in order to emphasize the importance of
commercial tropical timber species to the economies of tropical
timber producing countries and the need to avoid obstacles to
international trade in tropical timber."76 Other members of the
TWG include representatives from Cameroon, the Republic of
Korea, Malaysia, the European Union, the United Kingdom,
Switzerland, Costa Rica, Canada, the United States, Brazil,
Ghana, Japan, the World Conservation Union, the Traffic Net-
work, and the International Wood Products Association.77 The
TWG was reap-proved at the Tenth Conference of the Parties
and will be maintained with its current balance of membership
and approximate size until the Eleventh Conference of the
Parties.78
Although the TWG eventually may solve the conflict between
the CITES and the ITTO, for the reasons discussed below, this
"working group" method is too piecemeal to apply on a wider
scale in every international treaty congestion case. What occurs
in one treaty working group most likely will have no
precedential value for the next working group, especially if it
focuses on a different environmental or international topic. As a
result, the "wheel" will need to be "recreated" each time a po-
tential conflict or congestion problem arises and a working
group convenes.
III. How SHOULD THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ALLEVIATE
THE PROBLEM OF TREATY CONGESTION?
As the previous example of conflict between the ITTA and
the CITES illustrates, treaty congestion is a reality in the field
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Recent Forest Policy Meetings: Other Forest Meetings-International Tropical
Timber Organization (ITTO), supra note 72.
77. See Christopher Cantwell, CITES Works on Wood (visited Dec. 29, 1998)
<http'//www.goodwood.org/goodwood/goodwood-listICITES/itel.body.html>.
78. See CITES Decisions (visited Dec. 29, 1998) <http:/www.wcmc.org.uk/CITES/
english/edecis10.htm#67>.
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of international environmental law. Efforts continually are be-
ing made to address existing conflicts among international envi-
ronmental treaties and to prevent additional conflicts from
arising in the future. Agenda 21, finalized at the United Na-
tions Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de
Janeiro, lists one of its objectives as the ability "to identify and
prevent actual or potential conflicts, particularly between envi-
ronmental and social/economic agreements or instruments, with
a view to ensuring that such agreements or instruments are
consistent. Where conflicts arise, they should be appropriately
resolved ... ."9 What Agenda 21 does not provide, however, is
a method to resolve the conflict. Nevertheless, because the
problem of treaty congestion was brought to the attention of
international law makers, several suggestions have been made
as to how to better coordinate the existing and future interna-
tional environmental treaties.80
Part A of this section addresses four methods of reconciling
treaty congestion. These four methods have been discussed in
scholarly circles and, in some cases, have been used in an
attempt to solve the problem of treaty congestion. For the
reasons discussed below, however, as well as the continued
existence of this problem, these proposals have not eradicated
treaty congestion. Part B of this section proposes two new alter-
native methods."'
79. UNCED SURVEY, supra note 19, at 21.
80. See Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 261 (1992) (noting that an attempt to coordinate environmental
protection was made in the System-Wide Medium Term Environment Programme,
under which one document would include all environmental activities, frameworks and
strategies); SANDS, supra note 3, at 103 (noting that the international law-making
function is decentralized and fragmented); see also THE EDITORS OF THE HARVARD
LAW REVIEW, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 114 (1992) [hereinafter
TRENDS] (stating that the international community has wanted to coordinate inter-
national environmental agreements of the myriad intergovernmental organizations
(IGOS) for a long time).
81. When possible, the author reflects back to the CITES and the ITTA conflict.
See discussion supra Part II. Further, this article suggests how each proposal might
affect the conflict between the CITES and the ITTA.
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A. Current Efforts to Alleviate the Problem of Treaty Congestion
1. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties82
Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
suggests one solution to resolve issues of treaty conflict regard-
ing the "[a]pplication of successive treaties relating to the same
subject matter."" Article 30 states, in part, as follows:
1. The rights and obligations of States and international
organizations parties to successive treaties relating to the
same subject-matter shall be determined in accordance with
the following paragraphs.
2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it
is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or
later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.
3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties
also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not termi-
nated or suspended in operation under article 59, the earli-
er treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are
compatible with those of the later treaty.
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all
the parties to the earlier one:
(a) as between two parties, each of which is a
party to both treaties, the same rule applies as in
paragraph 3;
(b) as between a party to both treaties and a
party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to
which both are parties governs their mutual
rights and obligations.'
These rules of interpretation suggest that the following three
characteristics are important in determining the solution to a
treaty conflict: the membership of conflicting treaties in relation
to each other, time, and special treaty clauses.85 In addition,
82. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International
Organizations or Between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, 25 LL.M. 543
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
83. Id. at 561.
84. Id. at 561-62.
85. See Wolfram Karl, Treaties, Conflicts Between, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB.
INT'L LAW 467, 468 (1984). An example of a special treaty clause may be found in
Article 11 of the Basel Convention:
[Plarties may enter into bilateral, multilateral, or regional agreements or
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Article 30 suggests a simple method of dealing with treaty
conflict. As one scholar stated, however, "[i]ndeed, it is their
very simplicity which may occasion some concern, given the
varying types of situations which they are designed to cover." 6
This same simplicity also will cause Article 30 to fail in ad-
dressing the issue of treaty congestion. 7
Article 30 does not address all situations of treaty congestion.
The Article 30 requirement of "'relating to the same subject
matter' must be construed strictly. As a result, the Vienna
Convention does not cover instances where a general treaty
impinges indirectly on the content of a particular provision of
an earlier treaty.""8 Moreover, Article 30 does not cover gener-
al conflicts of obligation.89 Instead, these examples of treaty
congestion are harmonized away using various methods of in-
terpretation, and therefore, they are not resolved as true "con-
flicts" under Article 30.90
In addition, many procedural aspects of treaty congestion are
not addressed by the Vienna Convention. As this type of treaty
congestion is merely procedural in nature, it fails the "subject
matter" requirement of Article 30. For example, there is no real
"subject matter" conflict when two or more treaties require
separate reporting methods tracking the use of the same re-
source within the country. Consequently, only precise substan-
tive conflicts that arise as a result of treaty congestion are
covered under Article 30.
Article 30 also neglects to address the intent of the creating
parties in determining which provision of a treaty reigns supe-
arrangements regarding transboundary movement of hazardous wastes or
other wastes with Parties or non-Parties provided that such agreements
or arrangements do not derogate from the environmentally sound man-
agement of hazardous wastes and other wastes as required by this Con-
vention.
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal, art. 11, T 1, 28 I.L.M. 657, 668 (1989).
86. Sm IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 94-95
(Manchester Univ. Press 2d ed. 1984).
87. See id. at 98 (stating "[tihe rules laid down fail to take account of the many
complications which arise when there coexist two treaties relating to the same sub-
ject-matter").
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. See Karl, supra note 85, at 470.
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rior.91 Instead, Article 30 arbitrarily applies the principle of lex
posterior. Article 30 does not allow for a determination as to
whether the parties intended for the two provisions to conflict
with each other or for the later provision to prevail over the
former. Furthermore, in many instances of treaty congestion,
such as the conflict between the CITES and the ITTA, both
treaties are already in force before a conflict in the provisions
surfaces. Thus, applying the arbitrary rules of time, as Article
30 suggests, may not achieve the true or intended objectives of
the parties to either multilateral environmental treaty.
2. Creation of a Supranational Body
Increased communication and coordination between interna-
tional environmental treaties seems to be a logical and impor-
tant first step toward alleviating the problem of treaty conges-
tion.92 Probably the most common proposal to increase the
communication and coordination between international environ-
mental treaties, and thus alleviate the problems of treaty con-
gestion, is to create a supranational body.93 In theory, this su-
pranational body would have some attributes comparable to
those of all three branches of the United States government.
The supranational body that scholars and countries have envi-
sioned would have decision making powers, law-making powers,
enforcement powers, or any one of a combination of these three
attributes.94 For example, New Zealand, at the 1989 General
Assembly Debate for a new United Nations Environmental
Institution, proposed the development of an Environmental
Protection Council.95 This proposed body had both legislative
and decision making powers.96 In preparation for the Stock-
holm Conference, then United Nations Secretary General U.
91. See SINCLAIR, supra note 86, at 98.
92. See SANDS, supra note 3, at 104 (stating that there is a need for increased
coordination between international organizations, including those created by interna-
tional environmental agreements).
93. See TRENDS, supra note 80, at 123 ('The lack of centralized supranational
regulatory authority is often cited as the crucial barrier to effective environmental
protection and management.").
94. See Palmer, supra note 80, at 279.
95. See id.
96. See id.
1999] 1661
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1643
Thant proposed a "global authority" that would consist of "a
legislative body capable of establishing binding standards ...
and an enforcement authority with power to make conclusive
determinations as to compliance."97 The Soviet Union, at one
point, also advocated the establishment of a supranational body
with a more limited scope of jurisdiction. Specifically, they
proposed the establishment of a United Nations body similar to
the existing Security Council. This United Nations body would
enforce environmental obligations that affected a country's se-
curity.9
8
Theoretically, these proposed supranational bodies would be
able to integrate and consolidate international environmental
treaties with similar obligations and goals, thus eliminating
areas of jurisdictional overlap between treaties. 99 In the alter-
native, or in the process of consolidation, the supranational au-
thority also would resolve all conflicts that arise between trea-
ties by adjudicating one treaty provision superior to another.
Despite the seemingly attractive aspirations of a supranation-
al body to coordinate the field of international environmental
law, it is unlikely that such a supranational body will ever
exist or be able to accomplish these lofty goals. °° Perhaps the
largest obstacle to a supranational body is the notion of sover-
eignty. In general, countries are wary and unwilling to transfer
too much power to an international body over which the indi-
vidual countries have little or no control.'0 '
For example, in response to a questionnaire prepared by the
Secretary General of the United Nations for the 1980 Report of
the Secretary General regarding the Multilateral Treaty-Making
97. TRENDS, supra note 80, at 123 (omission in original).
98. See id. at 124 n.92.
99. In this regard, the supranational body would be similar to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) in the United States. The creation of the EPA has allowed
one agency to preside over all issues of environmental law and eliminate any jurisdic-
tional overlap between statutes.
100. See TRENDS, supra note 80, at 124.
101. See id. at 123-24; MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT 346 (1996)
(stating that "[p]eople will not pledge allegiance to vast and distant entities, whatever
their importance, unless those institutions are somehow connected to political arrange-
ments that reflect the identity of the participants"); SANDS, supra note 3, at 154
("Sovereign interests have .. . led states to be unwilling to transfer too much en-
forcement power to international organisations and their secretariats . . ").
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Process, most countries expressed the view that they would not
support the General Assembly's assumption of the overall coor-
dinating role in treaty-making. °2 One of the reasons for this
lack of support was concern over the autonomy of other interna-
tional organizations and countries."0 3 Part of the rationale be-
hind each country's concern over sovereignty lies within the in-
ternational norm of the doctrine of consent' 4 -a country is
unwilling to be bound and cannot be bound by any provision
unless it consents.0 5
Another reason for the failure of a supranational body may
be the importance of maintaining the heterogeneousness of its
members and the international organizations that it seeks to
bind. ' 6 The international community represents a wealth of
diversity in governing systems and people. This diversity and
consequently, the creativity in which environmental problems
are addressed in the world, could be stifled in complete global-
ization and homage to a supranational body.
Even if countries were to agree to organize a supranational
body, it is still questionable whether the supranational body
would be able to eliminate effectively the problem of treaty
congestion and increase efficiency in international environmen-
tal law.' ' The creation of a supranational body unquestion-
ably would lead to a bureaucratic nightmare.' 8 For example,
in the creation of the supranational body, countries would have
to come to a consensus on many procedural, political, and envi-
ronmental issues, including the following: (i) the number of
members in the supranational body; (ii) how is one chosen to be
a member; (iii) whether each member of the body would need to
102. See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 12, at 68.
103. See id. at 69-73.
104. See TRENDS, supra note 80, at 119.
105. See id.
106. See SANDEL, supra note 101, at 344-47.
107. See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 12, at 69-73. In written comments regarding
the proposal that the General Assembly assume an overall coordinating role in treaty-
making, several countries, such as Australia, Germany, Italy, and the Council of Eu-
rope express concerns that the centralization would slow down the multilateral treaty-
making process due to an overload in workload. See id.
108. See TRENDS, supra note 80, at 127, 129 (suggesting that smaller, more focused
intergovernmental organizations that exist under our current system are able to react
faster than a centralized system because fewer persons would need to be convinced of
a policy change).
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be knowledgeable about each international environmental trea-
ty; (iv) whether every member of the body would hear every
case; (v) how an issue would get before the supranational body;
(vi) whether the supranational body would hear cases involving
treaty congestion matters after they have occurred or whether
the supranational body would take a proactive approach in pre-
venting treaty congestion from happening; (vii) without prece-
dent, whether the supranational body would determine which
treaty takes precedence over another; and (viii) whether the
creation of a single all-encompassing environmental document
would be the responsibility of the supranational body or wheth-
er this responsiblity would be delegated. The sheer complexity
of creating such a body, along with issues of sovereignty, make
it a limited prospect in solving current problems of treaty con-
gestion.
3. Common Housing of Secretariats
Another remedy that has been suggested to solve the problem
of treaty congestion is to house the secretariats of related inter-
national environmental treaties together in the same build-
ing.'°9 With respect to the CITES and the ITTA, the Secretari-
at of the CITES currently is provided by UNEP and is located
in Lausanne, Switzerland,"' while the ITTA Secretariat is lo-
cated in Yokohoma, Japan."' Ideally, common housing would
promote frequent communication between the secretariats of the
international environmental treaties and their staffs. Also,
common housing would advance information and resource
sharing between secretariats and international organizations so
that each secretariat or organization could learn from or build
on what prior conventions or organizations already have
achieved."' Furthermore, common housing would reduce
109. See Brown Weiss, supra note 5, at 700 (noting that Agenda 21, developed by
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), suggests
the co-location of secretariats). Currently, such common housing exists in the field of
intellectual property.
110. See UNCED SURVEY, supra note 19, at 85.
111. See id. at 105; see also 1994 ITTA, supra note 10, arts. 17(2)-(4), 33 I.L.M. at
1025.
112. See Palmer, supra note 80, at 263-64.
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overhead costs and economize the various duties of the secre-
tariat."3
If the idea of common housing is to work as it is envisioned,
more integration between the conventions would need to occur
than just housing the conventions in the same building. During
the 1990s, UNEP moved the secretariats of the CITES, the
Climate Change Convention, the Biodiversity Convention, and
the Decertification into one building."' UNEP learned, how-
ever, that proximity does not always lead to efficiency or com-
munication."' The Secretariats did not communicate more fre-
quently while in common housing than they did while in sepa-
rate buildings, or even separate countries." 6 Eventually, the
secretariats moved back to their original locations."'
Despite this one example, common housing if structured prop-
erly, may assist in alleviating the problem of treaty congestion
and improving coordination among conventions. For example,
moving the CITES, the ITTO, and the ITTA secretariat, and
other secretariats of international organizations dealing with
forestry into common housing might be more successful." 8
Currently, provisions exist under the CITES and the 1994 ITTA
that require consultation among these organizations."' This
113. See id.
114. See Interview with Edith Brown Weiss, Francis Cabell Brown Professor of
International Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, in Richmond, Va. (Mar.
20, 1998).
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. Currently, the existing international organizations dealing with timber and
forestry include the following: CITES, ITTO, African Timber Organization, Asian-Pacif-
ic Timber Trade Organization, Center for International Forestry Research, Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Forestry Department, International
Boreal Forest Research Association, the International Wood Products Association;
International Union for Forest Research Organization, IUCN-The World Conservation
Union, Pro-tempore Secretariat of the Treaty for Amazonian Co-operation, Trade Re-
cords Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce, European Hardwood Federation,
World Coniervation Monitoring Centre, and World Wide Fund for Nature. See Conf
10.13: Implementation of the Convention for Timber Species (visited Dec. 1, 1998)
<http/wvww.wcmc.org.uk/CITES/english/eresoll011-15.htm#10.13> [hereinafter CITES
Resolution] (providing the text of Conf. 10.13, a CITES resolution).
119. See id. Under this requirement, any party seeking to present an amendment
proposal for a timber species must consult with at least four listed organizations to
verify both trade and biological data. See id.
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sharing and feedback of information could be facilitated if all of
these groups were under a common roof.
12
Contrary to the UNEP example of the CITES, the ITTA, and
the ITTO, common housing is supported by a legal necessity to
share information between the commonly housed parties. 2'
Therefore, if an instance of treaty congestion, such as the one
discussed between CITES and ITTA or between conventions
dealing with very similar environmental issues arose, the ex-
change of information could be facilitated by common housing
and proper organization within that housing. Furthermore,
when an issue of conflict between the treaties arose, the secre-
tariats, if all in one location, would be able to meet quickly and
assess the situation immediately.
22
As a more practical matter, common housing may be an in-
surmountable goal. If one were to try to house all of the inter-
national organizations that deal with a particular subject in one
building, the most likely result would be a large institution
which lacks the closeness and sense of community intended and
desired in a common housing concept."
4. Frequent Meetings of Secretariats
A more conventional approach to ensure communications
among secretariats would be to establish common meetings.
Ideally, these meetings would allow the various secretariats to
report the recent developments under the existing conventions
and discuss problems that arise from treaty congestion. 24 For
example, in the context of the CITES and the ITTA conflict, the
secretariats of the different timber related conventions could
meet annually or biannually to review various provisions re-
120. A common roof may, in some instances, be impossible. As an alternative see
discussion infra Part III.B.1 (regarding the Internet).
121. See generally discussion infra Part II.B.3.c.
122. The cost of traveling to a common place to negotiate a solution also would be
reduced.
123. With the CITES, the ITTA, and the ITTO, no less than sixteen groups, in-
cluding their support staff, would need to be commonly housed. See CITES Resolu-
tion, supra note 118 (listing the necessary forestry groups).
124. Two common meetings of the Secretariats that were organized by UNEP al-
ready have occurred, one in May 1995, and the other more recently in Geneva. See
Interview with Edith Brown Weiss, supra note 114.
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garding certain species." Even though these meetings may
not resolve current conflicts,12s they most likely would point
out areas of potential conflict and congestion, and could prevent
future conflicts from occurring.
B. Alternative Proposals to Alleviating the Problem of Treaty
Congestion
This section discusses two alternative proposals to address
the problem of treaty congestion. The first alternative is the
use of the Internet to facilitate communication among countries,
secretariats, and international organizations. The Internet also
may be used in conjunction with any of the other alternatives
discussed in this article. The second alternative consists of the
implementation of a "stop and think" provision, similar to that
found in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),27 to
be used in drafting new international environmental treaties
and solving issues of treaty congestion in current ones.
1. The Internet
Use of the Internet to increase coordination among secretari-
ats and to alleviate treaty congestion is a possible solution,
125. Such meetings of secretariats of related conventions already is provided for
under CITES Decision 10.132, which states that the secretariat of the CITES should
establish
good working relationships or, where possible, formal relationships with
the secretariats or relevant departments of the following organizations:
-International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO)
-Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
-IUCN-The World Conservation Union
-TRAFFIC (Trade Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce)
-World Conservation Monitoring Centre (WCMC).
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Decision of the Conference of the Parties (visited Apr. 5, 1999) <http'//www.wcmc.org.
ukICITES/english/edecisl0.htm>. In addition, the CITES Secretariat is required to
report results of working group meetings to the Secretariat of the Convention on
Biological Diversity and the succeeding organization to the Intergovernmental Panel
on Forests. See id.
126. Resolution of conflict may often entail amendment of the various treaties
involved. In most cases, the amendment process must involve approval by the various
parties to the conventions.
127. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1994).
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which, in the face of the Internet age, seems to be the most
logical and least costly method. 12' Because the Internet re-
quires no formal in-person gathering, secretariats and their
staff could communicate instantly, frequently, and at a much
lower cost.12  As technology develops, more possibilities of
online conferences between parties and the secretariats would
be feasible."
In addition to being used as a conferencing tool, the Internet
could be helpful as a place for publishing important scientific
and informational documents, as well as the treaties them-
selves."' Because this information can be easily accessed, it
may be more readily studied by other existing conventions and
by those parties wishing to draft a new treaty. Due to this
increased exposure of ideas, it is likely that inconsistencies in
new developing treaties could be avoided.
Finally, use of the Internet could alleviate some procedural
aspects of treaty congestion by providing parties with an alter-
native method of reporting and submitting information to the
necessary conventions. For example, under the CITES, customs
officers in the various states could immediately enter informa-
tion regarding the import and export certificates received at
that customs site into an international database. The secretari-
at or monitoring organization would have immediate access to
the information necessary to determine compliance. This would
eliminate the need for customs officials to report to their own
128. See Brown Weiss, supra note 5, at 700 (suggesting that the information revo-
lution would aid in the problem of treaty congestion by making communications easi-
er and less costly).
129. The transaction costs of Internet use would likely be less than travel expens-
es. Cf Joel B. Eisen, Are We Ready for Mediation in Cyberspace?, 1998 BYU L. REV.
1305, 1340 (1998).
130. See id. at 1313 ("The rapid evolution of the Internet guarantees that even
more revolutionary opportunities for interaction will soon be available. New forms of
electronic meeting places may eventually allow participants to simulate face-to-face
meetings.").
131. Many web sites currently contain various international environmental agree-
ments. See Index of /pidb/texts (visited Jan. 22, 1999) <http://sedac.ciesin.orgpidb/
texts/>. For example, the 1983 ITTA and the CITES texts may be found on the web
at Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators (ENTRI) (visited Jan. 22, 1999)
<http'J/sedac.ceisin.org/pidb/texts/tropical.timber.1983.html>; CITES (visited Jan. 31,
1999) <http'//www.wcmc.org.uk/CITES/english/>. In addition, the CITES has its own
web page that contains the current parties to the agreement, a copy of the treaty
and its appendices, and recent resolutions and decisions. See id.
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governments and for their own governments then to report to
the CITES secretariat, a process which currently takes years.
State agencies would then be able to focus less time on proce-
dural reporting issues and more time on substantive compliance
issues.
On the downside, the cost of implementing this program
would be great. Each customs official would need not only to
have access to the Internet, but also proper computer training
in order to be able to access and properly report information to
the database. This would be especially difficult to implement in
developing countries where monetary resources are already
stretched to a premium. This systematic hurdle would need to
be overcome before the benefits of the Internet in solving the
problem of procedural treaty congestion could be fully appreciat-
ed.
2. "Stop and Think" Approach to Treaty Congestion
The final alternative to a potential treaty congestion resolu-
tion mechanism is the creation of a NEPA-like "stop and think"
approach to treaty congestion. Although the identification of
existing instruments that bear on the same subject matter of a
proposal are part of the research currently performed at some
stage of the treaty making process, this NEPA-like approach
provides a more structured, consistent approach to addressing
treaty congestion." 2
a. The National Environmental Policy Act
NEPA, as one of its primary objectives, sets forth provisions
to ensure that "federal agency [decision makers] give environ-
mental factors appropriate consideration and weight."'33 NEPA
seeks, as its objective, "[i]nformed, environmentally responsible
[decision making]."" 4 The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia recognized this important objective in
132. See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 12, at 32-33.
133. NICHOLAS C. YOST, NEPA DESKBOOK 6 (2d ed. 1995).
134. Id.
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making uninformed decision making a "harm" to be addressed
by NEPA:
NEPA was intended to ensure that decisions about federal
actions would be made only after responsible [decision mak-
ers] had fully adverted to the environmental consequences
of the actions, and had decided that the public benefits
flowing from the actions outweighed their environmental
costs. Thus, the harm with which courts must be concerned
in NEPA cases is not, strictly speaking, harm to the envi-
ronment, but rather the failure of [decision makers] to take
environmental factors into account in the way that NEPA
mandates."5
To effectuate this goal of informed decision making, NEPA re-
quires that all agencies of the federal government shall include:
in every recommendation or report on proposal for legisla-
tion and other major Federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement
by the responsible official on
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed
action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which can-
not be avoided should the proposal be implement-
ed, [and]
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action."'6
Prior to making this "detailed statement" or Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS), the responsible official must "consult
with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has
jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any
environmental impact involved."3 ' The EIS must be prepared
early enough in the proposal stage that "it can serve practically
as an important contribution to the [decision making] pro-
cess."'38 The EIS is prepared in two stages: a draft EIS and a
final EIS."9 Both the draft EIS and the final EIS must be cir-
135. Id. at 6 (citing Jones v. District of Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 499 F.2d
502, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975)).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i)-(iii) (1994).
137. Id. § 4332(C).
138. Council on Environmental Quality, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5 (1998).
139. See id. § 1502.9(a)-(b).
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culated to all federal agencies that have jurisdiction or special
expertise with respect to the involved impact, to the applicant,
and to any person who requests it. 4 ° The federal agencies
that receive the EIS have a duty to comment.' Written com-
ments also may be submitted by other individuals. These
comments must then be assessed and considered both individu-
ally and collectively in the decision making process. 43
b. The NEPA Approach to International Environmental Treaty-
Making
An International Environmental Treaty Analog (-ETA) to
NEPA would function with a similar goal of informed decision
making as both an independent goal and as a means for pre-
venting and resolving treaty congestion. Essentially, whenever
an international organization seeks to propose a substantive
amendment to an existing international environmental treaty or
to draft a new international environmental treaty, the responsi-
ble secretariat or the international organization would prepare
an International Environmental Treaty Statement (IETS), a
functional comparison to the EIS.' In the case of already ex-
isting treaty congestion, both involved secretariats should par-
ticipate in the drafting of a joint IETS, specifically addressing
the particular conflict. Notice of the intent to create an IETS
should be circulated to all international environmental organi-
zations and secretariats with expertise or existing jurisdiction
in the same basic subject matter as the involved IETS.1' Fol-
lowing this notice, a draft IETS would be prepared by the re-
sponsible secretariat or international organization.'46 Copies of
this draft IETS should be circulated to the above mentioned
140. See id. § 1502.19.
141. See id. § 1503.2.
142. See id. § 1503.1.
143. See id. § 1503.4. The agency is required to respond to the comments in one of
the following manners: "(1) [m]odify alternatives including the proposed action; (2)
[d]evelop and evaluate alternatives not previously given serious consideration by the
agency; (3) [s]upplement, improve, or modify its analyses; [and] (4) [m]ake factual cor-
rections." Id.
144. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i)-(iii) (1994).
145. See generally id. § 4332(C).
146. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5.
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parties and the environmental departments of each country, as
well as be posted on the Internet for general review.
Receiving parties would then review the IETS and provide
comments.'47 Comments should include conflicts between trea-
ties and areas of particular treaty congestion that may arise if
the provisions in the IETS are implemented. 4 Comments
then would be considered and analyzed by the responsible sec-
retariat or international organization.' Any treaty congestion
issues should be addressed and resolved prior to the issuance of
the final IETS to the convention, which will ultimately be re-
sponsible for drafting the treaty in which the IETS provision
appears.15
The following is an example of the IETA in the current
CITES and ITTA context. The United States wishes to propose
to list bigleaf mahogany on Appendix II of the CITES. Upon
notification of this proposal, the CITES secretariat, in conjunc-
tion with the United States, would send out notice to the secre-
tariats of the ITTO, FAO, IUCN, TRAFFIC, ATTO, ATO, and
WCMC, as well as other international organizations specializing
in timber and forestry, of the United States's intention to create
an IETS. 5'
The draft IETS then would be prepared by the CITES secre-
tariat. The IETS should include the proposed listing, the impact
that it would have on existing international environmental
treaties, and an analysis of any alternatives. Copies of the draft
would be sent to the previously mentioned groups, as well as
signatories to the CITES convention. These receiving parties
147. See generally id. § 1503.2.
148. A similar requirement of notification of conflict already exists in some trea-
ties, such as the Basel Convention. The Basel Convention states that a party must
notify the secretariat of any bilateral, multilateral, or regional agreements or ar-
rangements entered into prior to the Basel Convention for the purpose of controlling
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes. See Basel Convention on the Control
of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22,
1989, art. XI, 28 I.L.M. 657, 668. These existing provisions could provide additional
stepping stones into an IETS process.
149. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4.
150. See generally id.
151. These organizations currently are in working relationships with the CITES
secretariat. See CITES Decisions of the 10th Conference of the Parties 10.132 (visited
Dec. 29, 1998) <http-//www.wcmc.org.uk/CITES/english/edecis#10.htm#127>.
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then would have a limited time, perhaps thirty to sixty days, to
review the proposal, evaluate whether this proposal would cre-
ate a conflict or congestion with their own treaty or existing
treaties to which they are a party, and send comments to the
CITES secretariat. The CITES secretariat then would consider
the comments and prepare a final IETS either incorporating or
explicitly rejecting these comments and addressing the specific
issues of treaty congestion that arose. The final IETS then
would be presented at the next conference of the parties for the
CITES.
c. Analysis of the International Environmental Treaty
Statement
Would the IETS structure work to solve the problem of treaty
congestion? Early identification of potential areas of conflict
through the IETS process would help to alleviate problems of
treaty congestion before they arise. Because the process involves
not only the proposing secretariat or international organization
but also any secretariats or international organization with a
potential conflict, a discussion of the treaty congestion issues is
mandated. The process also ensures that before the secretariat
or international organization takes action, it will have an in-
formed view of the status of that particular provision in exist-
ing international environmental treaties. Treaty congestion
issues should no longer come as a surprise; parties already will
have thought through problems of treaty congestion under the
IETS structure.
As with NEPA, there may be downfalls to the IETS struc-
ture. The first is time. It will take time and energy for a pro-
posal to go through the IETS process. In order for this proposal
to be effective, parties must carefully "stop and think" about
the effects that the IETS may have on already existing interna-
tional environmental treaties. This may slow the treaty making
process. Lastly, if the IETS system is used excessively, although
addressing substantive issues of treaty congestion, the IETS
process may ultimately end up creating a new form of procedur-
al treaty congestion.
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IV. CONCLUSION
As long as international environmental treaties continue to
proliferate in an uncoordinated fashion, the problem of treaty
congestion will continue to exist. The use of working groups,
such as the Timber Working Group, and the use of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties may solve specific instances
of substantive treaty congestion, but they will not solve the
problem as a whole. Instead, efforts in the future should focus
on creating a uniform system that seeks to addresses issues of
treaty congestion, such as the IETS proposal, before they occur
in the international communities. The Internet and frequent
meetings of existing secretariats should be used by countries
and international organizations to supplement this uniform sys-
tem and increase communication among treaty making bodies
in the international environmental community.
Bethany Lukitsch Hicks
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